

EYES ONLY

17 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Testing of Psychochemicals and Related Materials

1. At the conclusion of a meeting in your office on 29 November dealing with the problem of testing of psychochemicals and related materials, you asked that I submit a short paper to you on this subject. In discussing this matter, I would appreciate it if you would consider two aspects of the problem:


a. For over a decade the Clandestine Service has had . . . the mission of maintaining a capability for influencing human behavior; and . . .

b. Testing arrangements in furtherance of this mission should be as operationally realistic and yet as controllable as possible.

2. Most of our difficulty stems from the fact that, in our opinion, the individuals to be subjected to testing must be unwitting. This, unfortunately, is the only realistic method of maintaining the capability, considering the intended operational use of materials to influence human behavior. In the circumstances of potential operational use of this technique, it is virtually certain that the target will be unwitting. Any testing program which does not attempt to approximate this real situation will be "pro forma" at best and result in a false sense of accomplishment and readiness.

3. If one grants the validity of the mission of maintaining this unusual capability and the necessity for unwitting testing, there is only then the question of how best to do it. Obviously, the testing should be conducted in such a manner as to permit the opportunity to observe the results of the administration on the target. It also goes without saying that whatever testing arrangement we adopt must afford maximum safeguards for the protection of the Agency's role in this activity, as well as minimizing the possibility of physical or emotional damage to the individual tested.

4. In considering possible alternatives to our present arrangement with the Bureau of Narcotics, we have considered the following:



APPROVED FOR RELEASE:

DATE 19 January 1986 58-11

(17)

17

a. Arrangements with one or several police departments located in the principal cities of the United States. Contacts between the Agency and police departments in [REDACTED], for example, could be exploited.

b. Similar arrangements with prisons or prison hospitals through contacts in the Department of Justice could be investigated.

c. Various foreign intelligence and/or security organizations having a current and continuing interrogation problem

F/I [REDACTED] C.R. could be queried with this objective in mind.

5. I believe that none of the alternatives cited in the preceding paragraph satisfies the requirements for an acceptable testing program. Potential arrangements with local police departments necessitate the enlargement of the knowledgeable group to include individuals involved in local politics with its attendant unacceptable security problems. Past experience with the Bureau of Prisons in the Department of Justice has established their unwillingness to participate in the programs involving unwitting testing. We have attempted several times in the past ten years to establish a testing program in an overseas setting, using indigenous subjects. In every case the necessity of making an inordinate number of foreign nationals unwitting of our role in this very sensitive activity has made the program undesirable on security grounds.

6. Our present arrangements with the Bureau of Narcotics appear to be to be the most practical and secure method available to us to implement this program. While it is true that there is an element of risk in the present arrangement, it still affords us more security than any other method we can conceive.

7. In sum, if we are to continue to maintain a capability for influencing human behavior, we are virtually obliged to test on unwitting humans. The best method for conducting these tests securely is our relationship with the Bureau of Narcotics -- an arrangement which has stood up through eight years of close collaboration. Continued attention to observation and control of the results of the testing, as feasible, would be exercised.

8. While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which tends to intrude on an individual's private and legal prerogatives,

58-118

L-6-1
1911
133

tives, I believe it is necessary that the Agency maintain a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities in the manipulation of human behavior, and maintain an offensive capability. I, therefore, recommend your approval for continuation of this testing program with the Bureau of Narcotics.

DK
Richard Helms

Deputy Director for Plans

Distribution:

Original - DDCI
1 cc -- C/TSD
1 cc -- DD/P



58-119